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Austrian Non-Reception of a 
Reluctant Goldhagen
Pieter Judson
German translations of Hitler’s Willing Executioners appeared in Austria 
in September of 1996 to a strangely distanced reception. The book did not 
unleash in Austria the kind of public discussion it called forth in neigh­
boring Germany. The book did not even sell particularly well. Most Aus­
trian reviewers treated it with an exaggerated deference, praising the work 
for what they called its original focus on the participation of ordinary 
Germans in the Holocaust. Some went so far as to remind their readers 
that what Goldhagen had written about the Germans could be said of 
“Austrian citizens of the German Reich” or “citizens of Greater Ger­
many” (Grossdeutschland) as well.' While Austrian reviewers acknowl­
edged that the book’s more controversial conclusions had drawn strong 
criticism in American and German scholarly circles, they seemed to have 
missed the more interesting phenomenon altogether, namely, the degree of 
Goldhagen’s personal popularity in Germany. Instead, reviewers tended 
to describe the Goldhagen phenomenon purely as an academic contro­
versy over narrow issues of interpretation.
The bloodless reception in Hitler’s homeland of a book that charac­
terized ordinary German attitudes toward Jews as eliminationist and doc­
umented the active complicity of ordinary Germans in the Holocaust 
might seem surprising. After all, public opinion polls of the past decade 
have consistently registered lingering Austrian bitterness over the Wald­
heim controversy and a defensive anger directed toward “world Jewry.” 
Did no Austrians reject Goldhagen’s accusations as constituting yet
I would like to thank Matt! Bunzl, Heidemarie Uhl, and Douglas McKeown for their 
insightful comments on earlier drafts of this essay.
1. Hans Rauscher, “Ganz gewohnliche Deutsche,” Kurier, 17 August 1996, 3; Arbeit- 
skreis Goldhagen, Goldhagen und Osterreich: Ganz gewohnliche Osterreicherinnen und ein 
Holocaust-Buch (Vienna, 1998), 8.
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another smear campaign? More to the point, given the reasons for the 
book’s popularity in Germany, did not those Austrians seeking to undo 
the myth of Austrian victim status find it a useful confirmation of their 
arguments? Or did this nonreaction simply confirm the popular view 
among American, European, and some Austrian observers that Austrians 
stubbornly deny their perpetrator past? This latter was, for example, the 
conclusion reached by the Arbeitskreis Goldhagen, a group of left-wing 
university students who published the volume Goldhagen und Osterreich in 
the summer of 1998.^
Whatever else it implied, I do not believe that the bland reception 
Goldhagen received at the hands of the Austrians simply reflected an 
ongoing denial of Austrians’ historic participation in the Holocaust. The 
question of how to treat Austria’s Nazi and antisemitic pasts is in fact cen­
tral to public discourse in today’s Austria. The question underlies several 
current controversies, both within the academic community and generally 
in the public sphere. It permeates almost every new attempt by each of the 
political parties to reposition itself with particular voting groups. In a 
sense, the question cannot be escaped. We might find fault with the ways 
in which the question is debated, with its particular manipulations at the 
hands of historians, politicians, and journalists, but the general consensus 
that Austria was Hitler’s first victim no longer holds sway.
There is, therefore, some point in seeking to understand why Austri­
ans did not react to Hitler’s Willing Executioners. In a society where claims 
and counterclaims about the Holocaust, about Austrians’ relationship to 
the Third Reich, and about the nature of Austrian identity are today more 
bound together than ever before, it may be useful to investigate the rea­
sons why, in this case, the proverbial dog did not bark. In what follows I 
will argue that two contingencies—(1) the particular demands of Austrian 
politics in the fall of 1996, and (2) the nature of Goldhagen’s argumenta­
tion itself—ensured that Hitler’s Willing Executioners made few waves in 
Austria, even as it became a topic of almost obsessional proportion in 
neighboring Germany.
Austrian History, Austrian Identity
The new Austrian identity pieced together after the collapse of the Third 
Reich built on several political elements of the imperial and republican 
pasts, while strongly rejecting the German ethnic basis for national iden­
tity that had defined its predecessor. The first Austrian Republic had 
defined itself literally as the republic of German Austrians (the term Aus-
2. Goldhagen und Osterreich, 7.
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tria had theretofore included people of several national and ethnic 
identifications). Most citizens of the new state viewed potential Anschluss 
with Germany as their economic and cultural salvation, at least until 1933. 
After Austria achieved full independence in 1955, however, political lead­
ers of Austria’s two major parties, the Socialist Democrats (SPO) and the 
Catholic Peoples’ Party (OVP) tended to define Austria’s unique mission, 
and thus its identity in a Cold War world, according to its geographic sit­
uation between east and west, and its political neutrality.
This new identity ignored the paramount issue of Austria’s interwar 
history, namely, Anschluss with Germany. It therefore fostered a kind of 
amnesia toward Austria’s recent past, since it required a thorough denial 
of the powerful German nationalist traditions of the preceding fifty years. 
Austrian leaders were aided, of course, by the Allied declaration of 
November 1943 that proclaimed Austria Hitler’s first victim, and by the 
Allied tendency to equate Prussian German traditions with the cultural 
origins of Nazism. This official rejection of the recent past for a completely 
new identity meant that in the public sphere, at least, the recent past would 
remain largely unexamined.
Amnesia about its recent past, however, did not require a denial of all 
Austrian history. On the contrary, evocations of Austria’s imperial past 
have recently become a critical ingredient in the global popularization of 
Vienna as a center for tourism and high culture. It was also a critical ingre­
dient in Austria’s chosen identity as mediator between west and east, or 
between the developed and third worlds. Until the fall of neighboring 
communist regimes in 1989, Austrians often drew on a nostalgic vision of 
their imperial multinational. Catholic internationalist past to differentiate 
themselves from Germans and to construct a relevant mediating role for 
themselves in the Cold War era. The visible presence of Slovene, Czech, 
and Hungarian flags waving at Empress Zita’s funeral in 1989, for ex­
ample, was but a small reminder of Austria’s historic relationship to those 
“nations,” a relationship the latter now view far more positively than they 
did before fifty years of Soviet hegemony.^
3. In 1989 it was decided that a state funeral would be held in Vienna for the recently 
deceased Empress Zita, wife of the last Habsburg emperor Charles. Imperial tradition dic­
tated the route to be taken by the cortege through the streets of the inner city to the 
Capuziner Crypt, final resting place of the Habsburgs. More than one commentator noted 
that the imperial cortege would have to circle the Albertinaplatz, site of Alfred Hrdlicka’s 
recently erected monument to the victims of fascism. Should the coffin of the Empress (a 
reminder of a glorious tradition) be confronted with this brutal monument to Austria’s recent 
past? Some wondered whether the route might not be changed to avoid the monument’s bru­
tal evocation of Jews forced to clean Vienna’s streets during the Anschluss. The funeral, after 
all, was an attempt to recreate an imperial past that would evoke contemporary Austria’s
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When Austrians evoke the imperial past, it is, of course, an extremely 
selective process. Along with historicist architectural reminders of 
Vienna’s centrality in East Central Europe, the city also houses visible 
monuments to more unsettling by-products of that very same age. Several 
monuments, for example, recall the rise of political, cultural, and religious 
antisemitism in Vienna. Even the most innocent of tourists can’t fail to 
notice the ongoing popularity of Karl Lueger, Vienna’s greatest mayor 
(1897-1911) and founder of the populist antisemitic Christian Social 
movement in Austria. Several monuments, a church, and a segment of the 
Ringstrasse testify to Lueger’s gargantuan importance in Vienna’s con­
struction of its past and present identity. Today’s OVP situates itself con­
sciously as the postwar legatee of Lueger’s Christian Social party.
Historians, both Austrian and American, have themselves given 
Lueger the necessary alibi to remain a respected and beloved figure in Aus­
trian mythology, for his political use of antisemitism was above all consid­
ered opportunist and not ideological, situational and not racialist. 
Lueger’s was the cultural antisemitism of the ordinary person, not at all 
the virulently racist, ideological ravings of an Adolf Hitler or a Georg von 
Schonerer. This distinction parallels another important element in post- 
1945 Austrian public culture that makes it difficult to square today’s Aus­
trian identity with the histories of individual Austrians. Immediately after 
the war, politicians on all sides strongly condemned antisemitism but care­
fully defined it as the ideologically racialist view held by the Nazis. Their 
narrow focus on Nazi antisemitism enabled cultural, private, or religious 
antisemitic prejudice in Austria to survive largely unexamined. The latter 
forms of antisemitic prejudice became unlinked from the public, ideologi­
cal Nazi racism and continued to exist barely under cover, as documented 
by several public opinion surveys in the postwar period. This distinction 
had several critical repercussions, as Richard Mitten has pointed out: “[It] 
minimize[d] the significance of non-racial anti-Jewish hostilities, which no 
longer counted as antisemitic . . . [Tjhe identification of antisemitism with 
Nazism tout court implied that legitimate anti-Nazi credentials, which the 
founders of the Second Republic undoubtedly possessed, made one into 
an opponent of antisemitic prejudice.”"^
importance as a mediator between east and west. It would also remind the world of contem­
porary Vienna’s touristic value, explicitly celebrating the city’s role as the center of a multi­
ethnic, culturally vibrant Empire. The Hrdlicka monument, however, evoked a past of civil 
war and fascist cruelty. It is not that anyone would deny the existence of this other past, but 
rather that this past has no role in the definition of the present. In the end, of course, imper­
ial tradition prevailed, and Empress Zita passed by the Hrdlicka monument.
4. Richard Mitten, The Politics of Antisemitic Prejudice: The Waldheim Phenomenon in 
Austria (Boulder, 1992), 31.
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The new post-1945 Austrian identity did, however, take the legacy of 
the recent interwar period self-consciously into account in one important 
way. The political leaders of the new Austria were determined to minimize 
the kind of social and political polarization that had paralyzed the First 
Republic and produced civil war. In the social partnership system set up in 
1957, they devised a way to divide social and economic power proportion­
ately, not only among political parties, but also among the unions, cham­
bers of commerce, and representatives of industry whom the parties 
directly represent. This system, known as Proporz, worked to smooth over 
all potential conflicts between labor and capital and created an enviable 
social stability in the Second Republic. While it resembled comparable 
neocorporatist arrangements in Western Europe, the influence of Proporz, 
as we will see, extended much further into the public sphere than in most 
other societies.
As the Cold War receded, as traditional taboos faded, and, most 
importantly, as Austrians themselves began to explore their twentieth-cen­
tury histories more fully, questions emerged that undermined the tradi­
tionally shared assumptions of public life since 1945. The controversy sur­
rounding the 1986 election of Kurt Waldheim to the Austrian presidency 
was only the most obvious example of ongoing dissonance between public 
consensus and private memory. The typical answers Waldheim provided 
to emerging questions about his peace- and wartime records during the 
Anschluss years suddenly no longer sufficed to remove those subjects from 
public discussion, as they might have in the past. Another such dissonance 
erupted from public confrontation with the traveling exhibition “Vernich- 
tungskrieg: Verbrechen der Wehrmacht, 1941 bis 1944” in 1995-98. The 
exhibition documented in photographs the participation of ordinary Ger­
man soldiers in atrocities on the Eastern Front. It challenged the ways in 
which thousands of ordinary Austrians had interpreted their personal 
experiences of war. In doing so it suggested an unsettling newer history 
that both confirmed individual memory and disputed the traditional pub­
lic constructions that had up until now been used to interpret those mem­
ories. Ruth Beckerman’s film Jenseits des Krieges, for example, captures 
this dissonance superbly. Her interviews with Austrian veterans at the 
exhibition show how similar memories can produce clashing interpreta­
tions between those who seek to justify the atrocities and those who can 
find no justification for them.
Austrian public life in the past decade seems littered with incidents 
that confront Austrians with events for which they have only recently 
begun to acknowledge some personal responsibility. These incidents 
demand more than an admission of complicity, for they challenge the very 
founding myths of modern Austrian identity. Incidents like the Waldheim
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affair, confrontations like those surrounding the Wehrmacht exhibition, 
and, potentially, arguments in the Goldhagen book all point to a chasm 
between personal, lived memory and public national identity. They also 
make public a strong undercurrent of continuity between pre- and post- 
1945 ways of thinking about the world that precisely the public repudia­
tion of Nazi antisemitism after 1945, mentioned above, failed to address. 
Several scholars have shown convincingly that Austrians often defended 
Waldheim in 1986 using cultural tropes that strongly evoked antisemitism, 
even as Waldheim’s defenders publicly repudiated antisemitism. In the same 
way, critics of the “Crimes of the Wehrmacht” exhibition imagined an 
external conspiracy was responsible for denigrating the largely honorable 
men who had fought to defend their country (Grossdeutschland), while at 
the same time they deplored the fact that certain atrocities had taken 
place.^
The Austrian System in Trouble
Without a brief explication of Austria’s recent political history, incidents 
like the Waldheim affair, the Wehrmacht exhibition controversy, or even 
the public response to Hitler’s Willing Executioners appear to confirm that 
society’s long tradition of hiding behind its status as Hitler’s first victim. 
Yet this interpretation, popular in the West, misses several developments 
of the past two decades that also help to account for Jorg Haider’s mete­
oric rise. In Austria one cannot speak of a public sphere, or public debate, 
without invoking the political parties that dominate that sphere so com­
pletely. In Austria there is very little public space for any opinion that is 
not in some way connected to the parties. This is partly a result of Proporz, 
the attempt to avoid the social polarization of the 1930s by giving each of 
the major parties, the SPO and the OVP, some official role in almost every 
public institution, either through appointments or funding. Appointments 
to university positions largely depend on party relations within those insti­
tutions, and institutional research agendas reflect to a large extent party 
agendas. The extent of government-funded activity in Austrian society 
(from banks to unions to chambers of commerce to Austria’s newspapers) 
guarantees that particular debates will conform to party political ideolog­
ical positions. Even Austria’s relatively independent newspapers of record. 
Standard and Die Presse, are forced to engage in discussions whose para­
meters are often set by the party press.
In 1996 Austrian society enjoyed relative economic prosperity by gen-
5. See the excellent examples cited by Mitten in his Politics of Antisemitic Prejudice. 
chapter 8, “The Campaign against Waldheim and the Emergence of the Feindbild,” 198-245.
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eral European standards, yet it suffered from an escalating cultural polar­
ization. As the government moved to fulfill the budget-balancing require­
ments for adopting the euro, anxiety over job security grew. Since 1989 
many Austrians feared the dual specter of (1) cheap labor in the formerly 
communist neighboring states, and (2) a potential influx of southern and 
eastern European immigrants fleeing war in the former Yugoslavia. Aus­
tria alone, it was believed, would have to bear the burden of opportunist 
immigrants from the East and face the perceived security challenges that 
would accompany this immigration, while cutting subsidies to state- 
owned industries and welfare benefits to Austrian citizens. Polls taken in 
1995 showed that a third of Austrians believed that guest workers and 
other foreigners living in Austria already had too many benefits.^ Enthusi­
asm for the European Union was also on the wane, particularly given the 
possibility of its eastward expansion and people’s fears that this develop­
ment would negatively impact Austrian employment.
Since 1986 Austria has been governed by a so-called great coalition of 
SPO and OVP, with the socialists as senior partner. During those years, 
however, the vote totals for both major parties have fallen drastically, par­
ticularly in the case of the OVP, which by 1992 was garnering only 27 per­
cent of the vote at the federal level. The main beneficiary of this decline 
was Austria’s Freedom Party (FPO). The spectacular rise of the FPO and 
its charismatic leader Jorg Haider is the major phenomenon of Austrian 
politics in the past fifteen years. Originally a minor third party with single­
digit popular support at the federal level, the FPO traditionally gathered 
an odd collection of German nationalists, anticlericals, small businessmen 
excluded from Proporz, and economic liberals who opposed the corpo- 
ratist Proporz system. In the 1970s the FPO appeared at least superficially 
to be developing into Austria’s counterpart to Germany’s Free Democra­
tic Party (FDP). And indeed, from 1983 until 1986, under Norbert Steger 
and its liberal wing, the party joined the SPO in a social-liberal governing 
coalition. A stunning coup executed by Haider and his nationalist allies in 
1986, however, ejected Steger and the liberal wing from prominence and 
took the FPO out of the government and into opposition.
Ideologically the party moved sharply to the right; its program 
became synonymous with Haider’s own positions, themselves a mixture of 
populist opportunism and German nationalist tradition. And Haider’s 
stunning electoral successes only strengthened his power to dictate policy
6. Tony Judt, “Austria and the Ghost of the New Europe,” reprinted in Contemporary 
Austrian Studies 6 (1998): 126-37; Richard Mitten, “Jorg Haider, the Anti-immigrant Peti­
tion, and Immigration Policy in Austria,” Patterns of Prejudice 28 (April 1994): Ti-Al. Sub­
sequent poll data in 1999 show the number has risen to around half of all Austrians, with 
even higher numbers among older Austrians.
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within the party.’ The FPO took advantage of several realignments among 
Austrian voters that the two major parties ignored. Its popularity grew 
despite the fact that in 1993, the remaining social liberals abandoned the 
FPO to form their own party under Fleide Schmidt, the progressive Lib­
erates Forum (LiF). By this time, however, Haider had managed to make 
the FPO into a strong, populist, catch-all party of opposition to the status 
quo in Austria, attracting first the votes of conservatives dissatisfied with 
the 6VP and later, increasingly, the votes of workers dissatisfied with the 
SPO.^
Far more important to Haider’s rise than his German nationalist con­
nections and his implicitly revisionist view of the Third Reich, however, 
was his strongly xenophobic stance on immigration during a period of eco­
nomic restructuring and social uncertainty.^ Linking rising urban crime to 
the increase in immigrants and a crisis in the welfare system, Haider 
pushed a referendum to tighten Austria’s immigration laws and to force 
immigrants to work. He vigorously opposed membership in the European 
Union, and although he lost that particular battle, he soon benefited from 
the growing perception after Austria’s entrance that the drawbacks to the 
Union in fact outweighed the advantages. In the past four years Haider 
has even downplayed his explicit German nationalism (much to the disap­
pointment of his original supporters) for an Austrian nationalism 
grounded in the sacred notion of Heimat that conjures German national­
ist images less directly but more effectively. The FPO juxtaposes the ideal 
of Heimat to the perceived negative results of cultural pluralism, especially 
the growing threat of urban crime and welfare cheating. A 1998 FPO 
poster in Vienna trumpeted the words “Heimat, Sicherheit, Arbeit,” and 
more explicitly, “Our Heimat should remain OUR Heimat. ”
Haider’s successes need further contextualization, however. It is often 
forgotten that his is only the most successful, but certainly not the only,
7. Under Haider the FPO raised its federal election vote total in 1986 to 9.7 percent. In 
the 1990 elections it received 16.6 percent, while in 1994 it gained almost one-quarter of the 
votes cast. In 1995 the FPO vote total fell slightly, to 21.9 percent, but in the 1996 elections 
to the European Parliament (with no concrete repercussions for Austrian internal policy), the 
FPO gained 27.6 percent. Recently, in the parliamentary elections of October 1999, the FPO 
became Austria’s second largest party for the first time. In some of the federal states, the FPO 
regularly receives at least a third of all votes in local elections. In the 1999 elections in 
Carinthia the FPO gained 40 percent, enabling Haider to assume the governorship.
8. In 1983 some 2 percent of Austrian workers voted for the FPO, while 70 percent 
voted for the SPO. In the elections to the European Parliament of 1996, however, each of the 
two parties received about 40 percent of the working-class vote. See Reinhold Gartner, “Sur­
vey of Austrian Politics, 1996,” Contemporary Austrian Studies 6 (1997): 303.
9. For stunning examples of Haider’s statements on the Third Reich, and for his rhetor­
ical uses of the immigration and welfare issues, see Hans-Henning Scharsach, Haiders Kampf 
(Vienna, 1992), particularly chapters 5 and 8.
Austrian Non-Reception of a Reluctant Goldhagen 139
new party capitalizing on general popular frustration with the Austrian 
status quo. Austrians on both the left and right of the political spectrum 
are currently demanding a more democratized, less bureaucratized politi­
cal culture. To the new parties on the left that entered parliament during 
this period, the Greens and the LiF, less bureaucracy means more social 
and cultural pluralism, more basis Demokratie, less Proporz. For the 
Haider right, less bureaucracy means less red tape for business, less “wel­
fare corruption,” fewer union-boss privileges, as well as an end to Proporz.
Up until 1995, Haider’s successes in Austrian politics came mainly at 
the expense of the conservative Catholic OVP. Struggling to present a 
coherent alternative to the socialists, the OVP was nonetheless implicated 
by its presence in the coalition and its historic responsibility for the Pro­
porz system. Seeking to reverse his party’s freefall, OVP leader Wolfgang 
Schiissel precipitated a crisis in 1995 by calling for new elections. These, 
he hoped, would be won by an OVP that would present a dramatic 
Thatcherite conservative alternative to socialist policies. Implicitly, how­
ever, this strategy relied on the idea of an OVP-FPO coalition, since by 
itself the OVP was unlikely to gain more than a plurality of votes. In fact, 
most Austrian voters opposed this option, fearing it would bring economic 
instability. Schiissel’s decision backfired, and while the SPO actually 
increased its vote total to 38 percent, the OVP with 28 percent remained 
only just ahead of the FPO with 22 percent.The coalition was renewed, 
but in the shadow of a fast-growing FPO.
The political jockeying among the parties has been played out 
increasingly in the realm of cultural politics. Haider has all along been a 
master at exploiting cultural issues and social fears around immigration, 
antisemitism, and security. Constrained by coalition economic policies 
that bind it to the SPO, the OVP too has turned increasingly to the realm 
of culture and identity to give itself a recognizably differentiated identity. 
Church, family, and order are its stock-in-trade, along with subtle appeals 
to a rural nationalism against the cultural immorality of Vienna. Here the 
powerful influence of parties in the Austrian public sphere is clear. For if 
the OVP had not viewed the election of Kurt Waldheim as a crucial oppor­
tunity for it to regain power from the SPO in 1986, for example, the pub­
lic debate, the coded antisemitic attacks on Waldheim’s doubters, and the 
general defensiveness against outsiders attempting to control Austria 
would have been far less audible. Without the party (and party press) 
interest in giving it a specific construction, the Waldheim controversy 
could not have become a major public issue.
10. If one adds together the totals for the nongovernmental parties (FPO, Greens, LiF), 
it becomes clear just how much voter attrition has decimated the power bases of the two 
major parties in the past two decades. Over a third of Austrians now vote for other parties.
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Since 1986 and the breakdown of the victim consensus, all the parties 
appear implicitly to be debating the question of a useful and coherent Aus­
trian national identity. The debate mobilizes three distinct points of view. 
The OVP still defends a modified version of the traditional “victim” thesis 
against the newer “perpetrator” allegations of the SPO, Greens, and LiF. 
In his ten years in office, SPO Chancellor Franz Vranitzky was far more 
outspoken than any of his predecessors in acknowledging the damaging 
legacy of Catholic antisemitism to Austria, both past and present. In doing 
so, he abandoned the original myth that had enabled the SPO and OVP to 
find common ground since 1945. During Vranitzky’s tenure, and after 
long debate in 1995, the government finally sef up a National Fund for the 
Victims of National Socialism.Other politicians on the left, notably in 
the Green and LiF parties, expressed outrage about Austria’s hidden per­
petrator past. In 1997, after viewing the “Crimes of the Wehrmacht” exhi­
bition, Heide Schmidt, leader of LiF, spoke publicly about her past “blind 
spot” regarding antisemitism and Austrian participation in the Holo­
caust.'^ Haider’s growing success points to yet another manipulation of 
the debate. He deals neither in perpetrators nor victims, but rather defends 
the national honor of patriotic German Austrians who fought in the 
Wehrmacht and the SS from the accusations of so-called communist sym­
pathizer historians.'^
The elections to the European Parliament in the fall of 1996 offered 
activists a particularly fertile context to pursue their cultural agendas. 
Haider treated this election as the moment of his possible breakthrough 
(“Wahltag ist Zahltag!” proclaimed a determined Haider on several cam­
paign posters). The OVP and FPO fought to outflank each other, both for 
votes on the far right and now, as we will see, for the political center. As in 
the Waldheim years, history once again became an explicit battleground 
for struggles over Austrian identity.
The predictable gesturing to victim, perpetrator, or hero status of 
Greater German Austrians swiftly acquired new significance in the public 
mind due to a deft eoup executed by Haider in the 1996 campaign. The 
Austrian media rightly treated Haider as the most interesting and perhaps 
the most important figure on the Austrian political landscape, and in Sep­
tember of 1996, Haider did not disappoint. With an enthusiastic Peter
11. This fund is smaller than many critics would have liked, and its use is limited. Sev­
eral critics on the Left believed that the creation of the fund was far too little, too late, and 
that Vranitzky has not really earned the reputation he enjoyed as the man who had forced 
Austrians to face their history more honestly. Goldhagen und Osterreich, 17-18.
12. Christa Zoechling, ‘“Mein blinder Fleck’: Interview: Fleide Schmidt liber die Priisi- 
dentschaft und ihren Umgang mit der NS-Vergangenheit ihrer Eltern,” Profil 52/53 (20 
December 1997): 25-26.
13. Scharsach, Haiders Kampf 125.
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Sichrowsky at his side, Haider announced that the Jewish journalist and 
expatriate Sichrowsky, of all people, would lead the FPO’s list in the 
upcoming elections to the European Parliament. This particular coup 
scrambled the terrain of Austrian politics further, and it unleashed a storm 
of controversy within an already divided Austrian Jewish community. Not 
that this move by Sichrowsky and Haider was entirely unpredictable— 
Sichrowsky has a record of creating controversy, given his role in the 
Ignatz Bubis biography and his relatively cordial views toward Waldheim. 
This alliance, however, immediately provoked the use of terms not fre­
quently seen in the Austrian press, like Hofjude and Alibijude.
The heightened controversy surrounding the simultaneous opening of 
the exhibition “Vernichtungskrieg: Verbrechen der Wehrmacht, 1941 bis 
1944” in Klagenfurt a week later should be seen in this context. If Haider 
was going to make a play for the political center, neutralizing accusations 
of antisemitic crypto-fascism by displaying his Jewish credentials, the 
OVP, not to be outdone, would bid more openly for the crypto-fascist 
nationalist vote. Thus Bishop Egon Kapellari of Klagenfurt and the OVP 
governor of Carinthia, Christoff Zernatto, publicly declined to patronize 
or even attend the exhibit. In an interview, the governor rejected the 
“right-wing extremist cliches” with which Carinthia has been saddled. (In 
Carinthia, home of Jorg Haider, the FPO traditionally garners more of the 
vote than at the federal level.) The leader of the SPO in Carinthia opened 
the exhibition and claimed that while the majority of Carinthians have 
nothing to do with right-wing extremism, Nazi chauvinism, and heroizing 
of the war, still one could not forget that under the Nazi regime Austrians 
were not simply victims.’'* Interestingly enough, a year before in Vienna 
the exhibition had been sponsored and praised by politicians from both 
OVP and SPO; only when it left for the provinces did it become an object 
of political controversy.
The decision of the Vienna FPO to retain its racist election slogan, 
“Wien darf nicht Chicago werden,” despite the fact that its federal list was 
now headed by Sichrowsky, a Chicagoan; the studied lack of concern dis­
played by FPO leaders for new evidence that linked the accused desecra- 
tors of graves at a Jewish cemetery in Eisenstadt to the FPO’s Bundes- 
geschdftsfiihrer Karl Schweitzer (and the FPO youth organization); and, 
finally, the academic travails of the OVP candidate, the perennial would- 
be-Ph.D. Karl von Habsburg, all added to a politically polarized environ­
ment. Finally, the appearance of a runaway bestseller on Hitler and anti­
semitism raised the stakes of the debate further, forcing another open 
discussion of Austrian antisemitism on the public. The bestseller that
14. Profil 38 (16 September 1996); 34; Die Presse, 6 September 1996, 7.
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unintentionally helped stoke the flames of Austria’s political fires received 
enormous press coverage. Its author was repeatedly interviewed, and its 
thesis (particularly its emphasis on a culture of popular and Catholic anti­
semitism) was the subject of much public outcry. However, the book that 
gained so much attention was not Daniel Jonah Goldhagen’s Hitler’s Will­
ing Executioners. It was instead Brigitte Hamann’s Hitlers Wien: Lehr- 
jahre eines Diktators.
At precisely this moment, late August 1996, the German translation 
of Goldhagen’s book did indeed appear in Austrian bookstores. Its 
appearance was reported in the media, and the controversy it had 
unleashed in Germany and the United States duly described. The book 
was reviewed relatively positively, and editorials appeared on the scholarly 
aspects of the controversy the book had provoked in Germany and the 
United States. The book could be found on several journalists’ “best pick” 
lists of the season, but it did not unleash much of a public discussion in 
Austria, either among historians, in the media, among opportunistic 
politicians, or generally at large.
Goldhagen and the Austrians
The word Austria appears only once in the index of Hitler’s Willing Exe­
cutioners, referring to descriptions of how Austrians brutally forced Jews 
to wash the streets of Vienna after the Anschluss in March 1938. “The Aus­
trians’ hearty celebrations included immediate symbolic acts of revenge 
upon the Jews, who in Austria, no less than in Germany, were believed to 
have exploited and injured the larger society.”'^ In subsequent interviews, 
Goldhagen has stated that he treated the Austrians as part of the greater 
German people and therefore did not single them out in the book. In a 
September 1996 interview with Goldhagen, the Austrian newsweekly 
Profil asked him, with little success, to elaborate his views of the Austrians 
and their particular responsibility for the destruction of the Jews. Gold­
hagen maintained that because he considered the Austrians to be exactly 
the same as the Germans, just as enthusiastic and convinced about the 
destruction of the Jews, there was no need to single them out.
The Profil interviewers then asked about the higher percent participa-
15. Daniel Jonah Goldhagen, Hitler’s Willing Executioners: Ordinary Germans and the 
Holocaust (New York, 1996), 286-87, 605. There are no index entries for Vienna, Karl 
Lueger, Karl Iro, or Georg von Schonerer, for example, although Mauthausen does appear. 
The Schonerite Iro, as Hamann pointed out, made the suggestion in a speech to parliament 
that Hitler may have witnessed that immigrant Gypsies have an identification number tat­
tooed on their forearms. Brigitte Hamann, Hitlers Wien: Lehrjahre eines Diktators (Munich, 
1996), 191.
